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We used regression analysis to estimate  the impact of various 
determinants on the percent of loans in foreclosure across the 50 
states and DC over the 2009q4-2011q1 period.  More 
specifically, we applied the panel least squares estimator to a 
regression equation similar to the following: 
 FCit = β0 +  βHPIHPIit + βINCINCit + βDTRDTRit + Ɛit  
 
where  
• FC is the  percentage of outstanding loans in the ith state that 
started the foreclosure process during a given quarter (t) 
• HPI  is a house price indicator 
• INC  is an income shock indicator 
 
• DTR  is  the term that represents the “double trigger” effect. 
The house price indicator and income shock indicator are 
each demeaned and then multiplied together to create an 
interaction term.  This interaction term measures the effect of a 
combination of a falling house prices and a shock to income. It 
takes the following form: 
 DTR = (HPIit-HPImean)∙(INCit-INCmean) 
 
• The error term, Ɛit , captures the unobserved or unexplained 
component of the dependent variable 
• Period and regional fixed effects were included in each 
regression. 
The past few years have seen impressive variation in 
foreclosure rates across the United States, particularly at the 
state level. In the first quarter of 2011 the percent of 
outstanding loans starting the foreclosure process ranged from 
1.6% in Alaska to 4.5% in Nevada (Figure 1). What factors 
might explain the observed variation in the percent of loans in 
foreclosure?  
 
One of the key narratives of the foreclosure crisis has been 
“strategic default”. That is, those foreclosed upon are still able 
to make payments but choose to default on the mortgage as a 
financial decision motivated by falling house prices. Can falling 
house prices alone explain the variation in foreclosures? We 
explore this topic and present an alternate hypothesis, the 
Double Trigger Theory, as a way to explain the variation in 
foreclosures observed across states. 
House price shocks are indeed one of the defining explanations of the recent 
increases in foreclosures. Falling house prices reduce homeowners’ equity, and as 
mortgage equity falls to a point where the loan is considered underwater, or that the 
balance due on the loan is larger than the market value of the house, some 
homeowners may make the strategic decision to stop making mortgage payments.  
 
Existing research conducted with loan-level data, however, has documented the fact 
that falling house prices alone don’t explain all foreclosures; Bhutta, Dokko, 
and Shan (2010), for example, find that the "median borrower does not walk away 
until equity has fallen to -62 percent of the house value” – far deeper into negative 
equity territory than many borrowers have actually fallen. Why would this be?  
Homeowners attach value to local schools, proximity to amenities, personal 
connections and other non-observable elements of the home that might dissuade 
them from electing to default just because the home’s market value has decreased. 
 
An additional factor that may contribute to rising foreclosure rates would be a 
negative income shock (i.e. job loss). A strain on a homeowner’s budget might force 
a choice between mortgage payments and other consumption, raising the likelihood 
that he will default on his mortgage and enter foreclosure. Moreover, a combination 
of falling house prices and rising unemployment rates might explain more than each 
variable could alone. This hypothesis, known as the Double Trigger Theory, offers 
a key to explaining the observed variation in foreclosures. A homeowner with 
negative equity who has recently lost his job will be more likely to fall into foreclosure 
vs. a homeowner with negative equity who is still financially able to make mortgage 
payments. 
Data & Results 
Figure 1: Percent of outstanding loans starting foreclosure in the 1st quarter of 2011 
Motivations 
Variables, Expectations & Data 
Foreclosures: We used percent of outstanding loans starting 
foreclosure in a given quarter, drawn from the Mortgage Bankers 
Association National Delinquency Survey, as the measure of 
foreclosures. More specifically, we used variants of this series that 
include foreclosure starts for just subprime loans or just prime loans 
as well as foreclosure starts for all loans. 
 
House Price Indicator:  We constructed a series called “Number of 
Quarters Since Peak” to act as the house price indicator. First, the 
quarter in which the FHFA House Price Index reached its peak was 
determined for each state. Next, for each time period for each state, 
we determined for how many quarters the state’s house prices had 
been in decline. All else held equal, we expect that the longer the 
house prices are in decline (which corresponds to a higher value of 
HPI), the more likely it is that homeowners will fall into foreclosure, 
and the percent of loans starting the foreclosure process will rise. 
 
Income Shock Indicator: We used two representations of the 
unemployment rate for the income shock indicator. The first is the 
official unemployment rate, which is the series “U3” from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The second measure added underemployment 
(captured by the series “U6” minus “U5”) to the official unemployment 
rate. All else held equal, we expect an increase in this variable (either 
measure) to correspond to increases in foreclosure starts as more 
homeowners are experiencing income shocks. 
 
Double Trigger Term: As mentioned in the previous section, the 
double trigger term is an interaction term composed of the house price 
and income shock indicators, measured relative to their mean value. 
As this term increases in value, the state is experiencing house price 
and income shocks that are increasing in severity, so we expect 
foreclosure starts to rise along with the value of the double trigger 
term.  
Results 
 
 
 
 
Methodology Discussion & Future Research 
Double Trigger Theory 
The empirical results are encouraging because they reaffirm the link between house prices and  
foreclosure as well as between income shocks and foreclosure. Moreover, the results provide  
support for the Double Trigger Theory at the state level, a contribution to the existing literature  
documenting its importance at the individual (loan) level. However, it is our opinion that the results  
cannot represent the full depth of the Double Trigger effect. First, by using state-level housing  
data, we miss local variation in variables like house prices that are better observed at the  
metropolitan level (Figure 4). Being able to account for this local variation may potentially yield  
more interesting results about the interaction between income shocks and falling house prices  
and their collective impact on foreclosure starts. Second, while fluctuations in house prices and  
unemployment influence foreclosure rates, it must be noted that large scale foreclosure shocks  
can increase the speed at which house prices fall and unemployment rises. Our current  
methodology does not provide us with the tools to address this kind of endogeneity. In order to address these issues, subsequent 
research will take place using metropolitan-level data and an estimation approach, the panel vector autoregression, that treats the 
variables as endogenous.  
Figure 3: Unemployment rate (%), 2011q1  
Our regression results, for the most part, are consistent with  
expectations. Across all of our models we see positive and significant  
correlation between foreclosure starts and the house price variable, 
Number of Quarters Since Peak. The estimated slope coefficients on  
the income shock variables are also positive and significant across  
models; the models using Unemployment plus Underemployment  
tend to explain a greater fraction of the variation in foreclosure starts  
than the models using just Unemployment as the income shock measure. The estimated slope coefficient on the Double Trigger 
Term is also positive in all models, matching our expectation that a combination of declining house prices and increasing 
unemployment contributes to higher foreclosure starts and providing support for the Double Trigger Theory of foreclosure. 
Furthermore, this variable is highly significant for the models explaining foreclosure starts for subprime and prime loans. In the 
model for foreclosure starts as a percent of all loans, the statistical support for the Double Trigger Term is not quite as strong; the 
estimated slope coefficient is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.11) in the specification featuring Unemployment plus 
Underemployment as the income shock measure, but it is significant at the 5% level in the specification featuring Unemployment. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Percent change in house prices since recent 
peak, as of 2011q1  
Figure 4: House Price Index for Select 
Cities in Wisconsin 
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